We review the efficacy of three approaches to forecasting elections: econometric models that project outcomes on the basis of the state of the economy; public opinion polls; and election betting (prediction markets). We assess the efficacy of each in light of the 2004 Australian election. This election is particularly interesting both because of innovations in each forecasting technology, and also because the increased majority achieved by the Coalition surprised most pundits. While the evidence for economic voting has historically been weak for Australia, the 2004 election suggests an increasingly important role for these models. The performance of polls was quite uneven, and predictions both across pollsters, and through time, vary too much to be particularly useful. Betting markets provide an interesting contrast, and a slew of data from various betting agencies suggests a more reasonable degree of volatility, and useful forecasting performance both throughout the election cycle and across individual electorates.
I. Introduction
There has recently been a surge of interest in forecasting election outcomes (Cameron and Crosby 2000; Wolfers and Leigh 2002; Leigh 2004a; Jackman 2005; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2005b; Cuzán, Armstrong and Jones 2005) . Following the 2004
Australian federal election we now have even more valuable data with which to evaluate competing theories. In light of this new evidence, we assess the relative efficacy of three approaches: econometric models based on recent economic data; betting markets (also called "prediction markets"; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004) , and opinion polling.
Australia's 2004 poll proved to be especially interesting for several reasons. John
Howard was re-elected with an increased majority -an outcome that few pundits expected. And we saw important innovations in the application of each of the forecasting technologies we examine. The 2004 election occurred during arguably the best macroeconomic times in a generation, and yet even so, Howard's vote exceeded the expectations of economic forecasting models. This election cycle also saw the introduction of several new polling firms and polling technologies, but rising challenges for pollsters too, such as declining response rates and rising mobile phone penetration.
On net, we find little evidence that polls are becoming more accurate. Finally, election betting became even more popular, and we now have data from five betting markets run in Australia and the UK.
To preview our results, we find that economic models provide useful forecasts, particularly when making medium-term predictions. Consistent with international evidence (Berg, Forsythe, Rietz and Nelson 2001) , betting markets provide extremely accurate predictions, and in this election they not only predicted a Howard victory, but also the outcome in three-quarters of marginal seats. The performance of the polls was quite variable, and one's assessment really depends on which pollster you rely on;
Morgan's recent poor performance in the 2001 election was repeated again, potentially casting doubt on their emphasis on face-to-face polling. We also present a method for converting polling results into an assessment of the likelihood of victory. These results strongly suggest that the "margin of error" reported by the pollsters substantially overstates the precision of poll-based forecasts. Further, the time series volatility of the polls (relative to the betting markets) suggests that poll movements are often noise rather than signal. Table 1 shows key forecasts from the 2004 election cycle. We begin by presenting forecasts for the share of the two-party preferred vote won by the Coalition, providing election-eve forecasts, those taken three months prior to the election, and those taken a year prior. By construction, forecasts of the vote share of the Australian Labor Party are equal to 100 minus the Coalition prediction. Panel A shows several forecasts of the two-party preferred vote share. The Coalition government was ultimately re-elected with 52.74% of the vote, an increase of 1.79% on their performance in 2001. The economic models correctly picked the election winner, but surprisingly (given the strength of the economy) still under-predicted the Coalition's performance. That said, these models did predict a swing toward the Coalition: having predicted the 2001 election almost perfectly, the election-eve economic models suggested that the improved state of the macroeconomy would lead to a swing in the order of 0.3-0.7% toward the government. Importantly, these models were all pointing to a Coalition victory from at least a year prior to the election -a reflection of the stable and robust macroeconomic conditions during the entire election cycle.
II. The 2004 Election Forecasts
The polls paint a more variable picture. By election eve ACNielsen and Galaxy were predicting a Coalition victory, Newspoll declared a dead heat, and Morgan predicted a Labor victory. Three months earlier only Galaxy was predicting a Howard victory, and a year prior to the election the polls suggested, on average, a dead heat. The variability of predictions both across polls, and within polls over time, points to the difficulty of using them to form reliable forecasts.
In Panel B we convert each of our measures into an implied prediction of the probability of a Howard victory. Doing so requires us to estimate the probability that each indicator pointing to a Coalition victory is due to chance. For the polls, our numbers are guided by the estimated margin of error suggested by the polling companies. These estimates typically refer to sampling error, and given the binomial nature of the elicited voting intentions (when stated on a two-party preferred basis), the standard error (se) is calculated simply as se= n) 1 ( − , where q is the proportion of respondents who say they will vote for the Coalition, and n is the sample size. For example, assuming only classical sampling error, a poll with a sample size of 1 000, in which the parties were evenly matched, would have a standard error of 1.6% (and a corresponding 95% confidence interval of ±3.2%), while a poll with a sample size of 2 000 would have a standard error of 1.1% (a 95% confidence interval of ±2.2%).
Thus z=(q-0.5)/se yields a normally-distributed test statistic for whether or not a majority of the population intend to vote for the Coalition. The estimates reported in Panel B are the p-value for a test of whether the Coalition will receive more votes than the ALP.
2 In simple terms, if we assume only classical sampling error, we can take any two-party preferred poll result and sample size, and use these two figures to calculate the probability that the Coalition's two-party preferred vote exceeds 50%.
We should also note several assumptions inherent in this conversion. Importantly, our estimates account only for sampling error. Other possible forms of error may exist. For example, voters may respond to polls strategically rather than truthfully; polling samples may be skewed towards a particular kind of voter; and it may also be incorrect to assume that respondents who say that they "don't know" which way they plan to vote can be folded into all other respondents. In addition, we do not account for the fact that the parliamentary election system in Australia (like the electoral college system in the US), 2 In classical statistics, the p-value describes the probability of observing the polling data given the null hypothesis, while the statement that we are interested in making refers to the probability that the null hypothesis is true given the polling data. A Bayesian analysis allows the latter to be computed from the former. Assuming an uninformative prior yields a posterior for the probability of a coalition victory that in large samples is well approximated by a normal distribution with mean p and variance p(1-p)/n, and this provides a more coherent foundation for our probabilistic interpretations of the polls. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point to us. means that it is possible to win a majority of the two-party vote but lose the election. This has occurred in 5 of the 41 Australian federal elections (1954, 1961, 1969, 1990 and 1998) . As such, the probabilities implied by the polls should be interpreted as the probability of winning the two-party preferred vote, rather than the probability of picking the correct Prime Minister. Finally, it is possible that polls may represent voting intentions accurately, but these may yield poor forecasts of actual voting behaviour in the event that voters change their minds between the poll and the election.
A related approach can be applied to convert the voteshare estimates from the economic models into a probability of winning more than 50% of the two-party preferred vote. In this case the standard error of the forecast is calculated from past forecast errors, using the formula
, where s 2 is the mean square error of the prediction, column vector x j represents the n observations on independent variable x j , and X is an n x J data matrix. 3 These estimates -derived by applying the standard error of the forecast to a normal distribution to generate a probability -should again be interpreted as the probability of the Coalition winning a majority of the popular vote.
Finally, betting markets effectively involve trading a binary option on the re-election of the Howard government. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005a) argue that the price of such a security can be directly interpreted as the probability of the event occurring. Unlike the 3 The standard error of the forecast is calculated based on a regression assuming homoskedasticity (by contrast, note that the estimates in Table 2 use robust standard errors).
polls and economic models, this price can be interpreted directly as the probability of a Coalition Prime Ministership.
We believe that presenting election forecasts as probabilities is useful because it focuses attention not only on the point estimate of the likely winner, but also on the uncertainty surrounding that forecast. As such, we believe it important that accounts of polls and other forecasts focus on their probabilistic interpretations. Equally, the validity of this exercise depends on the validity of estimates of the errors associated with these forecasts, an issue we return to below.
We now turn to analysing the new data in somewhat more detail. We begin with economic models, then turn to prediction markets and finally opinion polls.
III. Economic Models
The logic of the economic models is simple: voters are more likely to re-elect incumbents who deliver a robust economy. This pattern can be motivated either as voters providing an incentive for politicians to deliver good outcomes, or as voters using available information to discern high-ability incumbents. Fair (1978) assembles evidence showing that the state of the economy was an important factor in US presidential elections. The subsequent Australian literature includes papers by Marks (1994), Jackman (1995) and Cameron and Crosby (2000) .
The first column in Table 2 shows the economic models -using updated economic data, but with the sample restricted to those elections in the models as originally published. We updated these economic models to include all data available prior to the 2004 election so as to allow a true "real-time" forecast; these estimates are reported in the second column. Adding the 1996, 1998 and 2001 elections to the sample substantially undermines the explanatory power of the Jackman and Marks (1994) and Jackman (1995) specifications. Updating Cameron and Crosby yields smaller changes in their estimates, reflecting their longer sample.
In general, Cameron and Crosby's model fits the Australian data well, but at the cost of parsimony: they include four economic measures, a honeymoon dummy, and five dummy variables for particular elections or wars. Of the four economic coefficients, unemployment and inflation are significant and in the expected direction, while real wage growth has a marginally significant but negative effect. Taken together, these estimates suggest that incumbents are more likely to be re-elected if inflation is low, and the real economy (measured in terms of unemployment) is near capacity.
We use these updated models to generate the predictions shown in Table 1 . These different models yields substantially similar predictions, suggesting on election eve a with earlier columns suggests that US voters are more responsive to economic conditions than Australian voters. This is a particularly surprising result considering that these specific models were (presumably) estimated to maximize their fit to the Australian data.
IV. Prediction Markets
The 2004 election cycle saw robust interest in election betting, and we have obtained data from four large Australian bookmakers: Centrebet, International All Sports, SportingBet and SportsAcumen. We also have data from a British sports betting exchange, Betfair, which operates in a manner akin to a futures exchange, in that participants buy or sell a contract paying $100 if a candidate wins.
Compared with other betting and prediction markets, total volume was substantial: We convert the betting odds to implied winning probabilities, and show them in 5 Based on the currency exchange rate on the day of the Australian election.
6 Based on the currency exchange rate on the day of the US election.
7 Where the return from a winning $1 bet is denoted as the payout:
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Betfair Centrebet International All Sports SportingBet SportsAcumen We can also make similar comparisons on a seat-by-seat basis. Twenty-two electorates were the focus of Centrebet's attention in both the 2001 and 2004 elections, and as at election eve on both elections, the Coalition was favourite in 15 of these seats. 8 However, the average probability of a Coalition win in these seats was 55% in 2001 and 60% in 2004 . This suggests that the market expected Howard to be returned with an increased majority. Figure 2 shows just the election campaign (the last six weeks of the 15-month period depicted in Figure 1 ). This figure provides an intriguing narrative of the key events during this election campaign. These four facts provide suggestive evidence in favour of the view that these prediction market prices are efficient. Table 3 provides further evidence on this score, presenting several formal statistical tests of market efficiency. We focus on the two prediction markets for which we have the most data: Betfair and Centrebet. Our Betfair data is trade-by-trade, and we convert this into daily prices, taking the last trade prior to 4pm
Australian Eastern Standard Time on a given day (on days where no trade occurred, we treat the market as closed). Centrebet prices are based on the bookmaker's price at the end of that day. 9 The only arbitrage opportunity we observed was between Centrebet and SportingBet on 5 October 2004, yielding an expected profit margin of 2%. In Panels A and B, we test whether the price of a contract paying $100 if the Coalition wins the election evolves in a manner consistent with the famous random walk hypothesis. Panel A shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (even at a 10% level of significance), while Panel B tests the alternative null that the price series is stationary. For Betfair data we can reject this null (at the 1% level); however for Centrebet data we are unable to reject it even at the 10% level. In Panel C we test weakform market efficiency: can one predict today's price change based on the price history?
We find little evidence of predictable price changes. Panel D presents a specific test of semi-strong form efficiency: Can we predict today's price changes on the basis of publicly available polling data? We implement this test by taking the weighted average of the last seven days of published polls. In the case of Betfair data, the small and statistically insignificant coefficients suggest that the market prices this publicly available information efficiently. For Centrebet, the coefficients are jointly significant -indicating some lag in the incorporation of polling data -but sufficiently small that they are unlikely to yield profit-making opportunities from normal movements in opinion polls.
What about the betting odds in the marginal seats? In the 2001 election favourites won in 43 of the 47 seats where Centrebet had allowed punters to place a bet (Wolfers and Leigh, 2002) . This time, Centrebet offered betting in 33 marginal seats.
10 Based on the odds reported on the morning of polling day, the favourite won in 24 seats, and lost in eight seats, while in one seat (Hindmarsh) there was no favourite, with Centrebet offering the same odds on the two major parties when the polling booths opened. The improvement in fit over the ensuing three weeks reflects the markets aggregating possibly new information about voter preferences and the quality of campaigns. We now turn to evaluating the polling data in greater detail.
V. Polls
The most commonly used means of forecasting election outcomes remains opinion polling. In Australia, three major pollsters have provided regular polls through at least the last seven elections: ACNielsen (formerly known as AGB McNair), Roy Morgan and Newspoll. The 2004 election saw the emergence of a fourth major pollster, Galaxy. In addition, the Australian National University, in conjunction with the Bulletin and the Nine Network, conducted an experimental internet election poll. We do not deal with the results of that poll here; a fuller discussion is found in Gibson (2004) and Jackman (2005) .
Of the four major Australian pollsters, all except Morgan conduct their polling by telephone.
11 Although the major pollsters do not publish their response rates, we can glean some evidence from the results of market research surveys. Bednall and Shaw (2003) found that the response rate to a short telephone survey (of the type most likely to be conducted by opinion pollsters) averaged 23%. Another factor is that pollsters do not typically attempt to contact those with mobile telephones.
Overall, the predictive power of election-eve polls remains low. Goot (2005) Goot calculates that the mean absolute error was 1.6% for ACNielsen, 2.9% for Morgan and 1.7% for Newspoll. Averaging these figures, the mean absolute error for the major Australian pollsters is 2.1% -the same as the mean absolute prediction error of Gallup, the largest US pollster (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004) . Given that voting is not compulsory in the US, this comparison does not favour the Australian pollsters. It is also interesting to compare the performance of the pollsters to the betting markets.
We begin by comparing the time series properties of each. In order to put polls and markets on the same metric, we convert the polls into an implied probability of a Coalition victory, using the method outlined above (treating the poll average as a cumulative sample). The implied probability of a Coalition victory is shown in Figure 5 .
To smooth out volatility in individual polls, we analyse the probability implied by the seven-day, sample-weighted poll average. The most striking aspect of this figure is the extreme volatility of the implied probability of a Coalition victory suggested by the polls. Specifically, if we believe that polls are afflicted only with sampling error, then for four months of the last election cycle the chance of the Coalition being returned was less than 1%, while for nine months of the election cycle, the chance of the Coalition being returned was less than 3%. It strains credulity to believe that the Coalition's probability of winning could have been this low over a substantial period. It is also difficult to believe what a weighted aggregation of the polls suggests: that over the course of the six-week election campaign, the Coalition's probability of winning rose from 0.7% to 98.3%. By contrast the betting markets suggest a more reasonable degree of variation in election probabilities (54%-77%).
We interpret the excess volatility of the polls as suggesting that published error margins are a substantial under-estimate of the true forecast errors. 12 As such, we also experiment with our own guess as to the relevant standard error. The dashed line in Figure 5 uses the polling results, but we inflate the standard error substantially, simply assuming that it is 10%. In other words, we assume that the true standard error of the polls is equivalent to a poll of 25 voters that suffered only from sampling error. While this seems a rather extreme assumption, it generates a far more plausible series than when we take the pollsters' estimates of their standard error at face value. The resulting estimate ranges from 26% to 66%, still demonstrating more movement than the betting markets, but now moving within a more credible range. Moreover, this estimate appears to move in lockstep with the betting markets.
Even though this assessment of the polls strikes us as more credible, Figure 5 still suggests that the polls were systematically more pro-Labor than were the betting markets.
Jackman (2005) contains a thorough assessment of the bias inherent in polls from each of the major polling organizations.
What does this suggest for those producing and publishing polls in future elections?
Given their low predictive power, we propose that pollsters provide more guidance to their clients as to their (in)ability to forecast election outcomes. Our results indicate thatfor forecasting purposes -the pollsters' published margins of error should at least be doubled. This is true for each of the four major pollsters covered here. At some point in the 2001-04 election cycle, ACNielsen, Galaxy and Newspoll each published figures which, if interpreted as a forecast, suggested that the Labor Party had less than a 0.5% chance of winning, while ACNielsen, Morgan and Newspoll each published figures suggesting that the Coalition had less than a 0.5% chance of being returned to power.
Consequently the media needs to display substantially greater caution in interpreting changes from one poll to the next. Indeed, even with the published margins of error, a 1% movement from one poll to the next is unlikely to be anything more than noise. But with the margins of error implied by our results, even very large movements are likely to be mere measurement error. Journalists who write about changes in poll movements without discussing the margin of error may well be guilty of misleading their readers.
13
Comparing the performance of marginal-seat polls and marginal-seat betting also yields some interesting comparisons. Table 4 provides the full set of comparisons that we were able to track down. Excluding the seat of Wentworth (where a prominent independent candidate makes it difficult to compare pollsters and bookmakers), the pollsters correctly predicted 7/10 seats (mean absolute forecast error=3.0%; root mean square error=3.9%), while early odds from Centrebet correctly predicted 6/10 seats. In a regression of the final two-party result on the two sets of predictions, neither pollsters nor bookmakers were (individually or jointly) a statistically significant predictor of the size of the Coalition's 13 For a discussion of this issue during the election campaign, see Leigh (2004b) . One could even regard this issue as a one of ethics. The Australian Journalists' Association Code of Ethics begins "Report and interpret honestly, striving for accuracy, fairness and disclosure of all essential facts. Do not suppress relevant available facts, or give distorting emphasis." eventual majority, although it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from such a small sample. 
VI. Conclusion
Writing after the 2001 Australian election, we concluded by stating our belief that betting markets and economic models both merited greater prominence in the media and in public discourse. In the case of betting markets, we are pleased to see some evidence that this has occurred. We carried out a citation search across the major Australian Appendices -1 "Honeymoon" is a dummy variable denoting the first election faced by the party of an incumbent president.
Appendix
(g)
The Cameron and Crosby model also includes separate dummies for World War I (1916 election) and World War II (1940 and 1944 elections) .
